

vail. But the primary examiner did not follow the rules. The rules provide that if appeal be regular *in form* (italics ours) he shall within five days of the filing thereof furnish the examiners-in-chief with a written statement of the grounds of his decision on all of the points involved in the appeal, with copies of the rejected claims and with the references applicable thereto. If he decide that the appeal is not regular in form, a petition from such decision may be made directly to the Commissioner. The regularity of the appeal in form is not questioned in the case at bar, and it was the duty of the examiner to answer the appeal by furnishing the examiners-in-chief the statement provided for in rule 135. A petition to the Commissioner was not necessary except to make the examiner perform his duty.

4. We do not think that petitioner was estopped from insisting upon his application by proceeding with the interference with Duncan after the examiner's letter of December 15, 1899. It would be pressing mere order of procedure and the convenience of the Patent Office too far to give them such result under the circumstances.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed with directions to reverse that of the Supreme Court, and direct the Supreme Court to grant the writ of mandamus as prayed for.

Ex Parte FRASCH.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 13. Original. Argued December 18, 21, 1903.—Decided February 23, 1904.

Mandamus to the Commissioner, and not to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, is the proper remedy to compel the forwarding of an appeal to the board of examiners-in-chief from the primary examiner.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Charles J. Hedrick for petitioner.

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Opinion of the Court.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General McReynolds, with whom *Mr. John W. Coit* was on the brief, for respondents.

MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to take jurisdiction of an appeal from the Commissioner of Patents.

The petition shows that petitioner was the first inventor of a new and useful improvement in the art of making salt by evaporation of brine, which improvement consisted of new and useful means for removing incrustation of calcium sulphate from brine heating surfaces.

Petitioner applied for a patent for his invention in due form, and expressed his invention in six claims, three of which were for the process of removing incrustation of calcium sulphate from heating surfaces, and three of which were for an apparatus for use in the process.

The primary examiner decided that "two different subjects of invention" were presented in the specification and claims, and required a division of the claims under rule 41 of the Patent Office. A reconsideration of the decision was requested and denied. A petition for an appeal to the board of examiners-in-chief was filed. The primary examiner refused to allow the appeal. A petition was then presented to the Commissioner of Patents praying that he make such order or take such action that petitioner's appeal to the examiners-in-chief might be heard, or, if that prayer be denied, that the Commissioner himself "consider the various matters all and severally raised by the appeal." Both prayers were denied and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. That court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. This petition was then filed and a rule to show cause issued. A return to the rule was duly made.

We have just held in *Steinmetz v. Allen*, *ante*, p. 543, that rule 41 of the Patent Office, in so far as it requires a division between claims for a process and claims for an apparatus, if they are related and dependent inventions, is invalid. We, however,

held that mandamus to the Commissioner, not appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District, was the proper remedy. It follows, therefore, that the rule to show cause should be discharged and the petition be dismissed, and it is

So ordered.

CENTRAL STOCK YARDS COMPANY *v.* LOUISVILLE
& NASHVILLE RAILWAY COMPANY.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT.

No. 149. Argued January 28, 29, 1904.—Decided February 23, 1904.

Neither the act of Congress of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379, nor section 213 or other provisions in the constitution of the State of Kentucky imposes an obligation upon a railroad having its own stockyards in Louisville under a lease from a stockyard company, to accept live stock from other states for delivery at the stockyards of another railroad in the same city and neighborhood, although there is a physical connection between the two roads.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Joseph C. Dodd and *Mr. Wm. D. Washburn*, with whom *Mr. J. L. Dodd* and *Mr. W. M. Smith* were on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Helm Bruce, with whom *Mr. Charles N. Burch* and *Mr. Ed. Baxter* were on the brief, for appellees.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming a decree of the Circuit Court which dismissed the plaintiff's bill. 118 Fed. Rep. 113. The bill was brought by the appellant, a Delaware corporation, against a Kentucky corporation, to compel it to receive live stock tendered to it outside the State of Kentucky for the Central Stock Yards